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The Northern Ireland Government, the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ and Ulster 
Unionism in 1966 
 
Abstract. 
This article presents original documentary material discovered at the Public 
Records Office, Northern Ireland (PRONI) relating to the RUC’s position in 
June 1966 on what was referred to as the ‘Paisleyite Movement’.  According to 
the documents which were sent by the RUC Inspector General to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ was an umbrella organisation which 
was made up of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee; the Ulster 
Protestant Volunteer Division; the Ulster Volunteer Force; the Ulster Defence 
Corps; the Ulster Protestant Action Defence Committee and the militant Ulster 
Volunteer Force. We know that these documents were seen by the Prime 
Minister, Terence O’Neill and the Minister of Home Affairs, Brian McConnell. 
These documents appear to have partly informed the cabinet decision to ban the 
UVF at the end of that month. The documents confirm the scale and significance 
of the threat presented by extremist Protestantism to the stability of the state in 
the eyes of the RUC and the Government at that time and suggest that the 




In his study of the religion and politics of Paisleyism, Steve Bruce makes it clear 
that the increased popularity of Ian Paisley’s religious message and Free Presbyterian 
Church had begun in the years before the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign of 
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1967 and 1968.  Bruce stresses that Paisley’s support grew as a result of the struggle 
between O’Neill’s liberal unionism and Paisley’s resistance; Walker emphasises the 
class dimension to these divisions (Bruce: 1986: 89, Walker: 2004: 157-62).  This 
essay seeks to develop the former insight by emphasising the sheer scale of the 
problem that Paisley and what was seen to be ‘his movement’ presented to the O’Neill 
Government in 1966.  It shows that some years before the official ‘outbreak’ of the 
Troubles street politics in Belfast were fraught and violent. Though nationalist 
celebrations of the 1916 Rising in their own areas acted as the ostensible catalyst for 
Paisleyite street politics it is clear that the Paisleyite challenge antedated and 
paralleled the celebrations.  The Lemass/O’Neill meetings of 1965, the debate on 
ecumenism, the naming of the new bridge over the Lagan, and O’Neill’s clumsy 
modernisation and gestural minority appeasement all served to raise the hackles of 
Paisley and his fundamentalist circle.  Through set-piece public provocation of the 
Unionist establishment the street politics of the summer of 1966 also provided the 
basis for a growth in popular Protestant support for the extreme views that Paisley and 
his close colleagues uttered.  O’Neill acted to ban the UVF on the basis of police 
intelligence that linked them, correctly or incorrectly, with Paisley.  Regardless of the 
correctness of the information with which O’ Neill was provided it nonetheless acted 
to confirm him in his analysis.  It obscured, perhaps fatally, what a letter from Robin 
Bailie, (later the Minister of Commerce in Brian Faulkner’s Government) to O’Neill 
later that year reveals – that direct support for the UVF was strong within the 
mainstream Unionist party, with whole branches like the Shankill effectively 
composed of UVF supporters.i  It demonstrates that the RUC intelligence on which 
the cabinet relied in June and July of 1966 was key to policy decisions. 
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 The political context of 1966 
The challenges which the mid-1960’s posed for unity within Ulster Unionism 
were unprecedented, as the existing historiography demonstrates (Mulholland, 2000; 
Bew and Patterson, 1996; Sayers, 1995). This article seeks to deepen our 
understanding of the debates within Unionism at that time. The extent of the 
challenges facing Unionist unity was epitomised in a speech to the Unionist Party 
Conference in April 1966 by the Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill.  
He congratulated the Unionist community on its tolerance in relation to the 1916 
Easter Rising Anniversary celebrations of that year which he argued had disabled a 
renewed IRA campaign.  In addition he also urged resilience in the face of various 
attacks: 
 
We can expect to face - as indeed we have already faced – attacks upon our constitutional 
position.  They will come from within:- from those who speak constantly of their rights but 
never of their obligations; from those who consider it normal to demand every advantage which 
our State confers, while refusing to concede it a minimum duty of allegiance… Attacks may also 
come from without:- from those in Great Britain – fortunately quite unrepresentative of British 
opinion as whole – who listen too readily to our enemies, and who ignore the evidence of 
Ulster’s loyalty given on the battlefields of two World Wars….We can expect attacks from those 
in the South who cannot stomach the plain fact of our existence…In the long term, there is no 
future in a modern democracy for the advocates of extreme courses…sooner rather than later, 
the great mass of people seek a middle ground.  I believe it also to be true that there is little 
future today for a Party whose appeal is exclusive…we have got to behave sensibly here at 
home.  It is a sad fact that the announcement of a new factory for Northern Ireland employing 
3,000 will receive far less notice in the popular press of the world than some incident whose 
very idiocy ensures a massive headline.ii  
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One such threat to which O’Neill referred was the threat of an IRA campaign.  1966 
marked the 50th anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising and there had already been 
considerable discussion about the possibility of a renewed IRA campaign.  Tensions 
relating to the potential for IRA violence dated back to November of the previous 
year. In November 1965 it was announced that any literature on the proposed 
commemorations of 1916 would be monitored by the RUC (Belfast Telegraph, 20th 
November 1965). In the course of the November 1965 Stormont election, the 
Government admitted that Cabinet Ministers had been advised to take extra security 
measures because of police reports that the IRA were planning to disrupt the 
upcoming election (Belfast Telegraph, 11th November 1965).  It seems reasonably 
clear that no military campaign was planned by the IRA.  Nonetheless the 
Government continued to concentrate on the potential for IRA violence at Easter 
1966. There had also been the suggestion that the anniversary of the IRA’s previous 
campaign in 1956 on the 12th December 1965 would provide the impetus for a 
renewed campaign.  The Minister of Home Affairs, Brian McConnell, declared “we 
are ready to deal with trouble” and it was also reported that the RUC and the Army 
were both reviewing their security measures in light of this anniversary (Belfast 
Telegraph, 11th December 1965).iii   
However, McConnell made it clear that the Government was “more worried” 
about the build-up of IRA activity in the period around the 1916 50th Anniversary 
than the 12th December anniversary (Belfast Telegraph, 8th December 1965).  While 
O’Neill and his Government expressed concern about an IRA campaign and did limit 
train travel from the Republic on the weekend of the Easter Commemoration (Belfast 
Telegraph, 15th April 1966), the Minister of Home Affairs, with the agreement of the 
RUC Inspector-General, had already revoked certain regulations which had been in 
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place during the IRA border campaign some years earlier under the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922-43.iv   From Government papers we 
know that some Ministers expressed concern at the security implications relating to 
the Easter Commemorationsv.  Many in the Cabinet also viewed the 1916 celebrations 
with dislike and distaste, but the Government was not prepared to impose a blanket 
ban on them in the light of the external scrutiny to which they felt themselves to be 
subject in the wake of a new Labour Government at Westminster.vi  Concerns relating 
to the opinion of the British Government featured prominently in O’Neill’s 
calculations and provided the context to the Government’s reaction to Paisley’s 
demonstrations at the Presbyterian Church of Ireland General Assembly (see below).  
During the elections the Unionist establishment had been happy to wave the spectre of 
danger from the 1916 celebrations at their supporters. They assumed however that the 
spectral genie could be put back in the bottle when elections no longer required 
standard Unionist horror-tales. Ian Paisley was however to demonstrate that the 
Unionist party leadership no longer had a monopoly on such tales, nor was their 
duration and potency at the leadership’s command. 
A number of unionist contributors to debates on the Easter commemoration in 
the Northern Ireland House of Commons made a case for the tolerance necessary in a 
modern state and the rights of minorities to express their allegiances, however 
repugnant.vii   In contrast considerable grassroots Unionist pressure was exerted upon 
individual members of the Cabinet from a range of local Unionist and Orange Order 
lodges at the temerity of nationalist celebrations, albeit  celebrations confined as in the 
past to nationalist areas.viii 
Ian Paisley led the more public and vocal objections to the Government’s 
decision to permit the 1916 celebrations.  Building on earlier protest acts by Paisley in 
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1964 which had threatened to lead to considerable civil strife he and his followers 
organised a number of demonstrations protesting at the Government’s decision to 
allow the celebrations of the 1916 Easter Rising 50th Anniversary.  Paisley organised 
a counter-demonstration in Belfast as well as a ‘thanksgiving’ service to the defeat of 
the 1916 rebels in the Ulster Hall (Belfast Telegraph, 16th April 1966). This service at 
the Ulster Hall which was offered ‘for the defeat of the 1916 rebels and the salvation 
of Ulster from Papal domination’ was organised through the Ulster Constitution 
Defence Committee of which Paisley was President.   In a message of defiance to 
O’Neill, Paisley declared that he had substantial support throughout Northern Ireland 
and attacked the “weakness of the Government for not stopping the stream before it 
became a current” and declared that “Ulster people are definitely not going to bow to 
IRA thugs” (Belfast Telegraph, 16th April 1966).     It was the possibility of a clash 
between the Commemorative parades and Paisley’s counterdemonstrations that held 
the real potential for violence at the time of the Easter commemorations held over two 
weekends in key sites throughout Northern Ireland. The Easter Commemorative 
Parade leading to Casement Park and Paisley’s counter-demonstration came close to 
meeting at one point but few incidents arose with the intervention of the RUC.ix  
Paisley’s march was reported to be 5,000 people strong while some 8,000 participated 
in the Falls Road commemoration with 20,000 spectators (News Letter, 18th April 
1966).  Real trouble was avoided by the decision by Paisley and his followers to call 
off a number of anti-1916 demonstrations which had been planned for Newry and 
Armagh (Belfast Telegraph, 9th April 1966).  As well as leading a number of high-
profile demonstrations Paisley saw the prospect of the  1916 Commemorations as the 
best possible opportunity to initiate publication of his newspaper, the Protestant 
Telegraph, which provided a vehicle for vitriolic attacks on, among others, the 
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Government, ecumenism and the IRA.  The paper focused on pernicious dangers to 
the future of ‘Ulster’ epitomised in the slogan of the Ulster Constitution Defence 
Committee organised protest of April 17th 1966 as referred to above. 
Once the relatively peaceful if highly supported Easter commemoration 
celebrations passed without significant incident, the Government’s concerns lay with 
the retrospective anxieties of sections of their own supporters and the related if 
distinct threats originating from the growth of extremist Protestantism as manifested 
in the sustained street politics of Paisley and rumours of renewed loyalist paramilitary 
forces. Activities with which Paisley and his followers were involved featured 
prominently in newspaper reports and debates in both the Northern Ireland House of 
Commons and Senate.  In the Senate, Senator Nelson Elder, referred to the damage 
caused by the Paisley campaign which in his view was aimed at causing a split in the 
Unionist Party:  
 
Let me say that there are individuals who have persistently criticised the Government.  By their 
periodic emotional, uncontrolled, bigoted outbursts they assist in this persistent agitation.  They 
are doing irreparable harm to the community…I think it can be said that no individuals and no 
groups existing in Northern Ireland at present will succeed in causing a divide either in the 
Government of the Unionist Party.  They will most certainly fail.x  
 
His colleague, Senator Norman Kennedy, called on the Government to take a stronger 
stance with such Protestant extremists: 
 
It perturbs me that irresponsible elements are allowed to damage our image abroad.  I appreciate 
that in any community there are a certain number of highly unbalanced fanatics, especially in the 
religious field.  Events seem to prove that here they are more mentally sick than anywhere else.  
The time has come when a certain person who uses the collar of religion and mistakes his brand 
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of religion for Christianity should be brought to book.  It is time the Government did something 
about this if we are to have a peaceful and prosperous country.xi 
 
Despite such calls for action the Paisley-led challenge to the Prime Minister, that 
acquired new ballast in April through the actual nationalist parades and pageants, 
gained considerable momentum as the year progressed.  As well as protesting at the 
Easter celebrations Paisley and his followers hosted a series of demonstrations 
throughout 1966 attacking both the Government and the ideas of ecumenism which 
they argued amounted to a Rome-led offensive on Protestantism.  The newspaper and 
street campaign came to a head at the Presbyterian Church of Ireland General 
Assembly at Howard Street in Belfast on 6th June 1966 when Paisley and members of 
the Free Presbyterian Church picketed the General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church of Ireland, an apparently annual event.  One of the speakers addressing the 
assembly that day was Jack Sayers, the politically influential liberal unionist editor of 
the Belfast Telegraph.  His letters and correspondence are extraordinarily illuminating 
in terms of revealing how Paisley became the bogey or ‘Mad Mullah’ for reforming if 
paternalistic unionists at this time.  Close to O’Neill and his senior civil servants, Ken 
Bloomfield and Harold Black, Sayers epitomises the concerns of middle class 
Unionism at this time and the nature of its distance from those who appeared to 
support Paisley.  Preoccupied by the demands of modernisation, the pressures from 
London, however slight, and the lure of ecumenism they saw little hope for a 
Northern Ireland that failed to ‘move with the times’. 
The Governor of Northern Ireland, Lord Erskine, already unpopular with 
Paisley’s circle after the incidents surrounding the naming of the Queen Elizabeth 
Bridge, was jostled on leaving the meeting at the General Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church and name-calling and verbal heckling met the departing 
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dignitaries including Sayers. The protest had been preceded by a march from the 
Ravenhill Road, permitted by the RUC, which resulted in incidents between Catholic 
residents in Cromac Square through which Paisley and his supporters marched (See 
Belfast Telegraph, 7th June 1966).  Paisley was eventually imprisoned as a result of 
those events outside the Presbyterian General Assembly on Howard Street for 
refusing to agree to keep the peace for two years (Belfast Telegraph, 6th, 18th, 20th July 
1966).  This seemed, however, further to strengthen Paisley’s support and resulted in 
a series of violent disturbances in the Shankill and Crumlin Road areas (See Irish 
News and Belfast Morning News, 25th July 1966). O’Neill was in London with Brian 
McConnell, the Minister for Home Affairs, at the time of the protests at the 
Presbyterian General Assembly and was to call on Roy Jenkins the Home Secretary 
on Tuesday 7th June to give an account of what had occurred.  The reason for the 
presence of O’ Neill and McConnell in London was ‘as a preliminary to the ‘informal 
talks’ on Northern Ireland affairs suggested by Mr Harold Wilson’ (News Letter, 7th 
June 1966) The eyes of London upon local events, the jostling of the Governor 
General and the unseemly scenes outside the Assembly may well have pressed 
O’Neill, whose primary concern was for London opinion, to resolve to deal with 
Paisley for once and for all. Certainly the substance of Paisley’s paper was unlikely to 
appeal to a London audience, nor did the anti-ecumenical anti–Papal posters look 
good for metropolitan consumption. Though the violence of 6 June may have 
originated in the actions of the residents of the Markets and the attempt to prevent the 
entry of the Paisleyite crowd into the area through the cordon of 200 people on the 
Albert Bridge, it opened up wider questions about ‘recent incidents connected with 
street parades, which –like last night’s – have received wide coverage on national 
television’ (News Letter, 7th June 1966). 
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The air of tension that prevailed in Northern Ireland throughout 1966 as a result 
of both Easter commemoration celebrations and Paisley’s subsequent protests was 
further heightened by references to the reformation of the Ulster Volunteer Force.  As 
a result the chairman of the National Democratic Party, John Duffy, claimed that 1966 
represented a time when Northern Ireland was “lurching once again into a period of 
bitterness, intolerance and violence” (Irish News and Belfast Morning News, 21st June 
1966).  Another statement that reflects the nature of events in 1966 came from the 
Lord Chief Justice at the time, Lord MacDermott, when he concluded that “the 
gunman is among us again” (Irish News and Belfast Morning News, 17th September 
1966).  The newly formed Ulster Volunteer Force issued a statement in May 1966 
from Captain William Johnston, purporting to be the assistant adjutant of the 1st 
Belfast Battalion of the Ulster Volunteer Force.  The statement declared: 
 
From this day on we declare war against the IRA and its splinter groups.  
Known IRA men will be executed mercilessly and without hesitation…Property 
will not be exempted in any action taken.  We are heavily armed in this cause 
(As reprinted in the News Letter, 29th June 1966). 
 
It was reported that the UVF was reformed on this occasion amidst fears that the IRA 
was planning a renewed campaign either in December 1965 or at Easter 1966 (Irish 
News, 29th June 1966).  At a court case later in 1966, one defendant referred in his 
statement to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force as a means to take reprisals 
against IRA activities (Belfast Telegraph, 18th October 1966).  The News Letter 
reported in the week prior to the planned Falls Road commemorative processions that 
the UVF had made its first overt move in support of Paisley by announcing its plans 
to march in the then upcoming Paisley demonstration from Carlisle Circus.  The paper 
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claimed that the militant Protestant group had been organising for some weeks and 
had 20 branches and 500 members in Belfast alone (News Letter, 15th April 1966). 
The relationship between Paisley’s movement and the newly formed UVF was 
blurred, and despite Paisley’s denials, O’Neill insinuated that there was a very clear 
link (See Belfast Telegraph, 30th June 1966).  O’Neill referred to a statement by 
Paisley in the Ulster Hall on 16th June 1966.  In this speech Paisley is reported to have 
referred to resolutions from a number of divisions of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
which pledged that they “were solidly behind Mr Paisley”.  The Prime Minister also 
referred at this point to a statement of thanks which Paisley extended to the UVF at a 
march on 17th April (See Belfast Telegraph, 29th June 1966; Irish News and Belfast 
Morning News, 30th June 1966).  As will be illustrated below, O’Neill’s statement 
banning the UVF in July 1966, in the aftermath of the murder of a bar man at Malvern 
Street, placed the activities of the UVF within the context of recent unrest associated 
with Paisley-led street protests.  O’Neill clearly viewed the UVF and Paisley as part 
of the one extremist Protestant movement, as one and the same threat posed to the 
Government and to Northern Ireland generally.  The basis for this is outlined in a 
RUC document (below) received by the Ministry of Home Affairs towards the end of 
June. 
 
The ‘Paisleyite Movement’ 
The space which Paisley-led activities assumed in the columns of newspapers as 
well as those of the House of Commons and Senate debates were intensified by the 
UK wide television coverage that his street politics received. Worried, as ever, by 
London opinion the Cabinet sought police briefing. The RUC Inspector-General, A.H. 
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Kennedy, in a letter to J.E. Greeves in the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 22nd June 
1966, marked secret and seen by the Prime Minister wrote: 
 
As you will see from the attached list of incidents a serious situation would appear to be 
developing in Northern Ireland which is all too reminiscent of the mid-1930’s when serious 
outrages occurred involving the deaths of a number of people by shooting , much damage to 
property by burning, looting and the infliction of personal injuries on many individuals . 
Read together with the appreciation of the situation created by the Paisley section  (our 
emphasis) which I sent you on 20th instant, I think it is not being unduly pessimistic to say that a 
real threat to the peace of the Province seems to be developing – a situation which could do 
immeasurable harm to Ulster if it is not checked. The police are doing what they can to keep 
control, but they cannot be everywhere at the right time and they have many other commitments.  
It seems to me that there is an urgent necessity for all persons in positions of authority to use all 
their influence to bring about a lowering of the temperature by pointing out on every suitable 
opportunity the dangers which exists and persuading those over whom they have influence to put 
the interests of the country first and to curb any words or actions which would have an 
inflammatory effect. 
 
The more interesting comments as to where the ‘threat to peace’ originated followed: 
 
While there is always the IRA and its splinter groups in the background ready to seize any 
opportunity to disturb the peace, the fact is that an equal or even greater threat is posed at 
present by extremist Protestant groups, many of whom are members of loyalist organisations.  
These are the people whom it may be possible to reach at meetings of the Loyal Orange Order 
and other similar bodies, and it may be that leaders of Protestant Churches could also play their 
part before it is too late.xii  
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The letter of 20th June, referred to here, is relevant. It purports to be an overview of 
what the RUC call ‘The Paisleyite Movement’. It must be read with caution as it 
represents the views and professed intelligence of the RUC at the time. Clearly such 
material is partial, open to question and cannot be taken as a transparent 
representation of anything other than the views and intelligence of the higher echelons 
of the police at that time. Nonetheless as such it is a vitally important document in 
conveying what that section of the police believed or wished to represent themselves 
to the Government as believing. It is also important as it represents at least a section 
of the information available to the Government for the formulation of policy at that 
time. Its importance in both of these respects cannot be exaggerated.  The information 
provided by the RUC to the Ministry of Home Affairs was as followed: 
 
The Paisleyite Movement…came into being after the formation of the Free Presbyterian Church 
following the breakaway from the Presbyterian Church in 1951.  The Free Presbyterian Church 
later installed the Rev. Ian R.K. Paisley as it moderator.  He is regarded as an idealist and a 
professed enemy of the doctrine of Rome.  He has been successful in increasing Church 
membership that he has now established Free Presbyterian Churches at the following places:- 
Belfast              Ravenhill, Mountmerrion and Sandown 
Co Antrim        Cabra, Rasharkin, Whiteabbey and Dunmurry 
Co Armagh      Armagh City 
Co Down          Crossgar and Portavogie 
Co L’derry        Coleraine and Limavady 
 
Paisley’s protests against the Archbishop of Canterbury’s visit to Rome in 1962 are 
outlined. According to the documents, Paisley had judged that the time was ripe to 
oppose the Prime Minister and the Government, given O’Neill’s meetings of 1965 
with the Taoiseach, Séan Lemass:  
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Following the O’Neill/Lemass talks which commenced in January, 1965, Paisley seized the 
opportunity to preach hate against the Prime Minister and members of the Government and 
accused them of selling Ulster down the drain.  He objected in the strongest terms to any form of 
appeasement or collaboration with the Government of the Republic of Ireland.  He called Mr 
Lemass a gunman and a murderer, and an enemy of loyal Ulster.  In February last, Paisley and 
his followers became more prominent as a result of their protest regarding the naming of the new 
Lagan Bridge in Belfast.  He attracted more attention and support as a result of a big protest 
march in Belfast on Sunday, 17th April, 1966, against the Government permitting Irish 
Republican Celebrations to be held in various parts of the Province to commemorate the 1916 
Rising in Ireland…Arising out of his protests over the Easter Celebrations Paisley reckoned that 
he had at least a following of 20,000 in Belfast and the way appeared open to him to seize 
greater power.   
 
The material goes on to detail what the police believe to be the exact steps taken by 
Paisley and his followers in creating a movement which in the view of the Inspector-
General took the form of an umbrella movement of organisations which were 
affiliated and managed by a Central Executive Committee.  Indeed it is clear from the 
statements by the Prime Minister that O’Neill believed a connection existed between 
the UVF and Paisley and this again is made explicit in O’Neill’s statement banning 
the UVF on 28th June 1966 in which he refers to information which he had received in 
recent days (See below).  He was presumably referring to the documents received 
from the RUC as referred to here.  Those RUC documents elaborate on the ‘Paisleyite 
Movement’: 
 
In collusion with his (Paisley) close confederates they decided to form a new extreme Protestant 
organisation.  It would operate under different names and each branch or division would be 
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permitted to have one elected representative on the Central Executive Committee.  For the 
present the organisation will be composed of the following:-  
(1) The Ulster Constitution Defence Committee 
(2) The Ulster Protestant Volunteer Division 
(3) The Ulster Volunteer Force 
(4) The Ulster Defence Corps 
(5) Ulster Protestant Action 
Their aims and objects are:- 
(1) To resist the encroachment of Popery in this Imperial Province of Ulster 
(2) To denounce the treacherous underhand action of the Unionist Party 
(3) To provide an alternative political voice for the loyalist thinking people 
(4) To follow in the footsteps of our forefathers in maintaining our Protestant heritage for the 
coming generations. 
(5) To organise Divisions in every County to demonstrate our loyalty to the Crown remaining 
Protestant 
(6) To conduct meetings throughout Ulster warning the people of the Government’s policy of 
appeasement 
(7) To have a Religious Service every Ulster Day, September 28th, in remembrance of the 
Covenant 
(8) To fight local Government and Parliamentary Elections in opposition to any Unionist or 
other candidate who does not conform to the ideals of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers.xiii   
 
Most controversially the Inspector-General’s report states that the Paisleyite 
movement had a militant wing and that the militant wing was the Ulster Volunteer 
Force which the report claimed was not only succeeding in recruiting from the Ulster 




The Ulster Volunteer Force is regarded as the militant wing of the organisation and operates 
under great secrecy.  Small divisions are known to have been formed in Belfast, Counties 
Antrim, Armagh and Tyrone.  There is little doubt that a good number of personnel in the Ulster 
Special Constabulary are active members; indeed it is feared that some have been recruited from 
other branches of the Crown Forces and Government departments.   
 
The aims and objects of this Force are:- 
(1) To counteract the IRA and other Nationalist organisations, if need be by force. 
(2) To keep the Government on its toes in regard to the constitutional position. 
(3) To keep a close watch on persons who are hostile to the Force, e.g., Mr Gerry Fitt and 
Messrs Sayers and Wallace of the Belfast Telegraph. 
In the event of it having to revert to the use of force, it would be almost entirely dependent on 
the main supply of arms being provided from secret sources and sympathisers in the Ulster 
Special Constabulary and Crown Forces. 
The militant sections’ activities have been conducted so secretly that great difficulty is being 
experienced in establishing the true details as to their exact manpower and armaments.  It is 
reasonable to assume that they can call on several hundred men to take up arms should the 
occasion arise for such drastic action.   It is evident from the public speeches and utterances 
from the Paisleyite platforms that they have no regard for either the Government or the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary.  Paisley and his clique gave every indication that they have no intention of 
relaxing their efforts to bring down the Government and speed the removal of His Excellency 
The Governor, Lord Erskine, from Northern Ireland.   
 
The threat from the IRA then, according to this analysis, was an indirect one and it 
was clearly felt that if the activities and strength of this extremist Protestant 
movement could be curtailed so too would the threat from the IRA be neutralised:  
 
The Police are fully aware that the IRA are busy operating behind the scene in getting members 
of their organisation to cause the occasional type of incident which will help to create a deeper 
sense of sectarian feeling throughout the Province.  When the IRA think the time is ripe they 
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will step in and open another campaign of violence in Northern Ireland.  The present political 
unrest is playing into the hands of the IRA and will provide them with an excuse to take action 
against the ‘forces of occupation’ and then claim they are protecting the Irish people.   
 
In an appendix to the letter of 20 June Kennedy gave precise information which 
he claimed was available to the RUC at that time as to the members and organisation 
of the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ throughout Northern Ireland.  According the ‘Appendix 
B’ the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee in Belfast had as its chairman the 
Moderator of Free Presbyterian Church, Rev Ian R.K. Paisley, Beersbridge Road, 
Belfast.  Its vice-chairman was listed as Councillor James McCarroll, a building 
contractor from Ballylesson, County Down. The secretary was stated to be Noel 
Docherty, a printer from Dunmurry County Antrim.  The Ulster Constitution Defence 
Committee was stated to consist of a number of named individuals.  It was stated that 
in County Antrim various divisions of the Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee 
were being formed; that a Ballymena Division was at this stage in the course of 
formation under the guidance of a named painter from the town.  Similarly it was said 
that a Carrick Division was in the course of formation and its secretary was listed in 
the RUC documents as being from Newtonabbey.  A Lisburn-based division of the 
Ulster Constitution Defence Committee had also been established.  Its members were 
listed.  The Ulster Constitution Defence Committee was also stated to be involved in 
establishing a number of divisions throughout County Armagh.  The formation of an 
Armagh City Division, Markethill Division and Portadown Division was underway.  
At that stage there were no divisions in counties Down, Fermanagh and Londonderry. 




The divisions are named after Parliamentary Constituencies or local Government Wards in 
which particular members reside e.g. 1st St George, 1st and 2nd St Anne’s, 1st Pottinger, 1st 
Windsor, 1st Shankill and QUB Division.  It is said that there are about 30 divisions in Belfast 
with an increasing membership of more than 500. 
 
A Dunmurry Division of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers was in the course of 
formation in June 1966 and once again the secretary here was Noel Docherty of 
Dunmurry and its committee consisted of what appears to be four members of the 
same family also from Dunmurry.    The Ulster Protestant Volunteers also had a 
branch in Tyrone.  The makeup of the 1st East Tyrone Division’s Committee appeared 
to suggest that the branch was concentrated in Pomeroy in the county.  The 
Committee was said to consist of a number of listed individuals all of whom were said 
to be from Pomeroy.  Interestingly, all those listed as members of 1st East Tyrone 
Division were, according to the RUC, members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. 
Similar details on the Ulster Volunteer Force were included in the appendix.  
The details appeared to indicate a certain crossover of membership between the 
different divisions within the ‘Paisleyite Movement’, including the UVF.  The 
secretary of the Ulster Defence Constitution Committee in Belfast, Noel Docherty, 
was also listed as the secretary of the Belfast branch of the Ulster Volunteer Force.  
An already named member of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee in 
Ballymena and William Mitchell, also of Ulster Protestant Action, who were both of 
Newtownabbey, were said to form the committee of the Belfast-based Ulster 
Volunteer Force.   
The Glengormley division of the Ulster Protestant Action had as its members a 
named individual from Newtownabbey; another man already named as a committee 
member of the Belfast Ulster Volunteer Force; and named  committee members of the 
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Belfast Ulster Volunteer Force.  The level of crossover between the different divisions 
of what the police called the ‘Paisleyite Movement’ is highlighted here.xiv 
 
The Government’s Response 
It was becoming clear by June 1966 that the O’Neill Government would have to 
respond to ongoing unrest that had become associated with the Paisleyite 
demonstrations in Belfast.  The Government had been under pressure since the 
protests outside the Presbyterian Assembly in June to restrict Paisleyite processions.  
12 Unionist backbenchers tabled a motion objecting to the Howard Street incidents 
and insisting that measures be taken to ensure they were not repeated (Belfast 
Telegraph, 14th June 1966). The murder of Peter Ward outside a bar on Malvern 
Street exposed the sinister nature of events in Belfast at this point (Newsletter, 27th 
June 1966; Belfast Telegraph, 28th June 1966).  O’Neill returned from a Somme 
memorial event in France to make the announcement that the UVF was now an illegal 
force.  His statement illustrates the connections which he made between events 
surrounding recent Paisley street protests, information that he had received in the past 
days and his decision to proscribe the UVF.  He declared that “the events which we 
discussed in this House on June 15 - (the Howard Street and Cromac Square 
disturbances) – were, in all conscience, serious enough but what we have got to 
consider is far more grave and grim.  Human life has been wantonly taken” 
(Newsletter, 29th June 1966).  He referred both to ‘a conspiracy of criminals’ and to 
information which he had recently received: 
 
We are confronted by terrible acts which have shown no mercy to youth, no respect for old 
age….Information which has come to hand in the last few days make it clear that the safety of 
law-abiding citizens is threatened by a very dangerous conspiracy…This we cannot and will not 
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tolerate…Let no one imagine that there is any connection whatever between men who were 
ready to die for the country on the fields of France, and a sordid conspiracy of criminals 
prepared to take up arms against unprotected citizens (News Letter, 29th June 1966).   
 
At this point Paisley absolutely denied that his Ulster Constitution Defence 
Committee had any links with the now illegal Ulster Volunteer Force (News letter, 
29th June 1966).  He claimed that branches of his association throughout Northern 
Ireland were known as Ulster Protestant Volunteer Divisions and were not involved in 
any subversive activity.  Paisley denied any knowledge of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(News Letter, 29th June 1966).  The News Letter confirmed that Paisley’s movement 
was not affected by the new ban since, according to the paper, the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteer Corps/Divisions were a separate organisation (News Letter, 29th June 
1966).  O’Neill quickly refuted Paisley’s denials of links with the UVF through 
reference to Paisley’s earlier statements in which O’Neill claimed Paisley had 
welcomed the support of the UVF (Belfast Telegraph, 29th June 1966).  It is quite 
clear that O’Neill viewed the series of events in Belfast as connected.  O’Neill’s 
statements on the UVF and Paisley together with his action in relation to both 
certainly indicate that he viewed these two problems (the reformation of the UVF and 
the increasingly vocal and active Paisley movement) as one and the same.  
The Government had now taken action on the UVF but Paisleyite 
demonstrations and street violence continued throughout the summer of 1966 
particularly in the aftermath of Paisley’s imprisonment for his failure to agree to keep 
the peace in the aftermath of the protests at Howard Street in June.  Protests at 
Paisley’s imprisonment in Crumlin Road Gaol in July forced the Government to take 
action.  On Saturday 23rd July Police used water-cannon to disperse a crowd which 
defied restrictions on a demonstration by Paisley’s supporters.  The march which was 
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some 4,000 strong (Bruce, 1986: 85) had been restricted, as a result of a decision 
taken jointly by the RUC and the Ministry of Home Affairs in the aftermath of the 
three nights of disturbances outside Crumlin Road Prison where Paisley and two other 
Free Presbyterian Church ministers had been imprisoned, to the Shankill (Belfast 
Telegraph, 23rd July 1966).  Some looting and raiding resulted and extensive damage 
was caused to property in the area (Belfast Telegraph, 23rd July 1966).  Despite 
Paisley’s message from Gaol calling for the rioting to stop (Bruce: 1986: 86), politics 
in this period was very evidently played out on the streets.  As a result the Cabinet 
met on the 25th July to consult on recent events in Belfast and to discuss further 
restrictions to the processions in the area.  In a secret memorandum on the recent 
disorders in Belfast presented to the Cabinet by the Minister of Home Affairs, Brian 
McConnell, at this meeting on 25 July 1966, the Cabinet was urged to agree to a ban 
on further processions in Belfast: 
 
…stern measures should be adopted to help the police in their task of maintaining law and order. 
The existing powers under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts and the Public Order Act 
of 1951 are adequate to meet most needs but, in present circumstances and with the unpleasant 
prospect of a continuation of rioting and looting, we should consider whether they should be 
further exercised or strengthened.  It is possible under Section 2(2) of the Public Order Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1951 to impose a complete ban for a period of three months on all 
processions and public meetings within the County Borough of Belfast and a radius of 20 miles 
there from which have not received the specific approval of the Government on the 
recommendation of the police.   
 
McConnell referred to the potential for additional unrest and suggested the Police 
ought to be empowered to deal with such circumstances: 
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One of the great dangers in the present situation is the gathering of small groups, perhaps 
initially in a peaceable manner, but which ultimately results in a disorderly assembly.  It is true 
that the police under the common law have a right to disperse unlawful assemblies, but it might 
be well to confer upon them, under the Special Powers Acts, a specific power to disperse any 
assembly of three or more persons wherever there is reasonable belief that the assembly might 
lead to a breach of the peace.xv 
 
At this Cabinet meeting, which was also attended by the Inspector-General and the 
Deputy Inspector-General of the RUC, the Cabinet consented to the Minister’s 
request.  While the Ministers “generally agreed that additional steps must be taken for 
the preservation of the peace and the protection of property” there were some 
concerns.  It was felt that exceptional action would create an “exaggerated impression 
of the situation in Northern Ireland, by suggesting that it had been necessary to 
impose something close to martial law”.  Ministers also wanted “to avoid as far as 
possible an allegation that those responsible for the current disturbances were being 
treated more harshly than the organisers of Republican demonstrations.  It was highly 
desirable to avoid any heightening of the sense of martyrdom which had stemmed 
from the imprisonment of the Howard Street demonstrators”.  The need to balance 
these concerns with the demands of public opinion was realised and some present 
argued in favour of “a prohibition directed at particular named organisations that, 
since the public know very well the sources of the current disorders, they would give 
the Government more credit for acting directly against those sources”.  In the end the 
Cabinet came to the following decision: 
   
After further discussion, it was decided that the Minister of Home Affairs should make an Order 
under the Public Order Act (Northern Ireland) 1951 prohibiting, for a period of three months, the 
holding of any public procession or outdoor public meeting in any public highway, road or street 
 23 
within a radius of fifteen miles of Belfast City Hall…In addition, the Cabinet agreed that a 
Regulation should be made under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts to provide that 
where, in the opinion of a District Inspector or Head Constable any gathering of three or more 
persons was calculated to lead to a breach of the peace or serious public disorder, or to make 
undue demands upon the Police Force, it would be an offence for the persons constituting such a 
gathering to fail to disperse, when called upon to do so by any police constable.xvi  
 
Again the level of anxiety surrounding the activities of Paisley and his followers is 
evident here and reflected in the decision to revert to the use of the Special Powers 
legislation in response to extremist Protestantism.  
 As always O’Neill’s concern was with the impression that Paisleyite 
demonstrations were making on opinions in Britain and in particular on the attitude of 
the British Government.  On 10th October 1966, while Paisley was still imprisoned at 
Crumlin Road Gaol, O’Neill together with Captain Austin Ardill, MP, and Ken 
Bloomfield received a deputation of Ministers of the Free Presbyterian Church. The 
Ministers who attended were Reverend Cooke, Rasharkin, who was Acting 
Moderator; Reverend McClelland, Sandown Road, Belfast; Reverend Cairns, Cabra; 
Reverend Douglas, Portavogie.  Also in attendance was Reverend Brian Green from 
London.  The meeting appeared to come about through Captain Ardill who had been 
approached by a number of constituents. In the course of the meeting Reverend 
Cooke, who acted as the principal spokesman for the group, outlined to O’Neill and 
the others present the rationale behind the Paisleyite protests.  According to the record 
of the meeting: 
 
Reverend Cooke declared that this part of the United Kingdom would be sustained by Protestant 
votes.  Their main enemy was the attitude, and the departure from the Protestant faith, of leading 
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denominations.  In Northern Ireland the religious situation was very closely connected with the 
political.  They felt bound to warn the Protestant people where their leaders were taking them. 
 
Reverend Cooke stressed that the group was not only unhappy at the imprisonment of 
their colleagues but that their punishment had been much more severe than that 
received by organisers of certain of the 1916 demonstrations.  They accused the 
Government of taking steps to silence the protests of their colleagues.xvii  Responding 
to a request for an assurance that future demonstrations which were within the law 
would be permitted, O’Neill pointed out the possibility that such protests could lead to 
further disorder.  The Prime Minister’s words to the delegation revealed his 
preoccupation with British opinion:  
 
He (the Prime Minister) was not suggesting that the adherents of the Free Presbyterian Church 
themselves were necessarily directly responsible for such disorders, but their demonstrations 
appeared from experience to attract an element which created disturbance and did Northern 
Ireland a great deal of damage…The Prime Minister said that we valued our place in the United 
Kingdom, and the benefits which this connection brought to the people of Ulster, including the 
supporters of those who were present. The plain fact was that Mr Harold Wilson and Mr Edward 
Heath had made it perfectly clear to him that not one MP at Westminster, of any Party, could 
support the speeches and actions of their followers.  This had serious implications.  His job as 
Prime Minister was to keep Northern Ireland a respected part of the United Kingdom, and a 
movement such as theirs – which did not have the respect of the overwhelming majority of the 
British people – could do us no good. 
The Prime Minister said that the effect of their activities in London could not be denied.  He 
recalled that the Belfast riots of the Thirties had been followed by Mr Chamberlain’s decision to 
hand back the Treaty Ports.  The post-War Labour Government, conscious of Ulster’s 
contribution to the war effort, had resisted pressure from a strong group of backbenchers.  Now a 
Labour Government was in office again, and again it was under pressure from its backbenchers. 
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It the situation in Northern Ireland were to deteriorate to the point where the United Kingdom 
Government said ‘We won’t have this in the United Kingdom’, then there could be a very great 
threat to our constitutional heritage and to all the economic benefits which were at stake.  
Captain O’Neill said that he was well aware that he could seek the path of easy popularity by 
pursuing a narrow sectional interest.  But his job was to keep Northern Ireland as a respected 
part of the United Kingdom.  They lived in a world where wider issues could not be ignored… a 
continual parading led to scenes of violence which gave us a bad image in the eyes of the world 
and made it difficult for the Government to protect Northern Ireland’s good name. 
 
The delegation accused the Prime Minister of distorting the image of Paisley and his 
followers in Britain.  O’Neill responded 
 
by referring to the scurrilous remarks which the “Protestant Telegraph” printed about him.  If the 
Paisleyites were so keen to ensure that their views were not misunderstood at Westminster, why 
did they not circulate this newspaper to Members there?  This led to a moderately heated 
exchange with Reverend Green, who first of all said he would not want this paper to go to 
Westminster, and when pressed referred to technical difficulties in distributing it.xviii   
 
O’Neill’s profound anxiety about potential responses in Britain to disturbances in 
Northern Ireland acted as a motivating factor for the Prime Minister in dealing with 
events throughout 1966 (For the Labour Government’s approach to Northern Ireland 
in this period see Rose, 2001; Warner, 2005).  Indeed O’Neill’s suspicions of British 
opinion generally were not unfounded.  For example, the Prime Minister was 
informed in a letter from Stratton Mills, Unionist MP at Westminster, in November 
1966 that  
 
the Tory Party in the House of Commons (also at Highgate Young Conservatives, which I 
visited last week) [there is] a growing feeling of unease about events in Northern Ireland and this 




Paisley’s protests against the 1916 Easter commemorations, his anti-
ecumenical demonstrations, together with the civil disorder which continued 
throughout the summer of 1966 brought a new dimension to protests on the streets of 
Northern Ireland.  The impression that Paisleyism emerged as a reaction to the 
demands of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign from 1967/8 onwards is 
disputed by this fact.  Support for Paisleyism emerged as part of a growing level of 
resistance and unease at O’Neill’s policies which were perceived as liberal and in 
many senses as threatening to Protestantism and Northern Ireland in general (Bruce, 
1986: 89). The chasms within unionism in this period are reflected in Sayers memoirs 
(1995).  The seemingly unbridgeable distance between O’Neillism, associated with 
modernisation and liberalism, and Paisleyism in 1966 presents the major focal point 
for examining unionism and politics in Northern Ireland in that year.  The picture 
outlined by the RUC in the documents presented above illustrates the serious levels of 
perceived instability in Northern Ireland in this period.  Other contemporaneous 
documents also confirm the unease, disquiet and uncertainty within the Unionist 
Party.  For example, Robin Bailie’s letter to O’Neill in the summer of 1966 refers to 
unease at what he saw as ‘budding fascism which has been nurtured on the anti-
catholic feelings that have continued to persist in the minds and attitudes of a very 
large section of the Protestant population and which have at best connived at and 
pandered to by those seeking popular political support’.xx According to this analysis 
the threats to public order and paramilitary support did not spring from outside the 
Unionist party but were nurtured in branches of the mainstream party, some of whom 
were seen to support UVF action. 
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The RUC material presented above provides a number of specifics relating to 
the RUC’s position on the UVF in 1966 and their view of the relationship between 
Paisley and the UVF.  The RUC documents clearly served to reinforce O’Neill’s 
belief that Paisley and the UVF were part of the same extremist Protestant movement.  
However, it is important to record the questions that have been raised about the 
motives and interests of the RUC in 1966.  Gusty Spence has, for example, 
maintained that the RUC and the Government in 1966 were deliberately trying to 
connect Paisley to the UVF in an attempt to discredit Paisley and cause those 
members in the Unionist Party involved with the UVF to disassociate themselves 
from that organisation (Garland, 2001: 66-7).  Spence’s claim that members of the 
Unionist Party were key to the UVF, particularly in the Shankill, is partly confirmed 
by Bailie’s letter referred to above.xxi   Spence also claims that “the brains behind this 
UVF were even at cabinet level” (Garland, 2001: 62).xxii Spence’s assertion that the 
RUC and the Government were deliberately contriving a connection between Paisley 
and the UVF, however, remains unproven.  
The RUC documents centrally deployed in this article offer a unique insight 
into the thinking of the police, the policy briefing of the Government and the basis on 
which security policy was formulated in 1966. They indicate the seriousness with 
which the security forces and O’ Neill’s Government viewed the threats presented by 
what they called the ‘Paisleyite movement’ and also illustrate the insecurity of the 
Northern Ireland state in the middle of 1966. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
i Document entitled ‘Statement of Present Problem’, no date but the document can be dated to 
sometime around September 1966, available at Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, File No. 
PM/5/31/23 Ulster Unionist Council: Annual Conference arrangements, business meetings, PM’s 
Speech etc, 1966-9. 
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ii Speech by the Prime Minister (Capt O’Neill) at the Unionist Party Conference on Friday Evening 
(9:15) 28th April 1966, Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, File No. PM/5/31/23.   
iii In fact in the Northern Ireland House of Commons on the 16th February 1966, the Minister of Home 
Affairs, Brian McConnell, referred to additional revenue which he had needed in taking extra security 
precautions including the mobilisation of part-time members of the Special Constabulary in response to 
the threat of renewed IRA activity.  See Northern Ireland Commons Debates, Vol. 62, Col. 1066, 16th 
February 1966.  See also Belfast Telegraph 27th October 1966. 
iv See ‘Memorandum for the Cabinet by the Minister of Home Affairs on the Revocation of 
Regulations made under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922-1943’, 
25th June 1965, Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. FIN/18/8/52. 
v At a Cabinet Meeting on 3rd March 1966 the Minister of Agriculture expressed concern about security 
surrounding the Easter Commemoration celebrations, Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, File 
No. CAB4/1326/15. 
vi See letter from O’Neill on 5th April 1966 to Sir George Clarke, Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, as 
agreed at a Security Committee meeting 4th April 1966.  Public Records Office Northern Ireland, File 
No. CAB9B/299/1. 
vii See for example Nat Minford’s contribution to a debate at the Northern Ireland Commons Debates, 
Vol. 63, Cols. 230-1, 24th March 1966. 
viii See file at Public Records Office of Northern Ireland CAB9B/299/1. 
ix Gordon, The O’Neill Years, p 68.  For coverage of the incidents which resulted at Carlisle Circus see 
Belfast Telegraph 18th April 1966, News Letter 18th April 1966. 
x Northern Ireland Senate Debates 7th June 1966 Vol. 49, Cols. 902-3. 
xi Northern Ireland Senate Debates 7th June 1966 Vol. 49, Col. 900. 
xii Letter marked secret from A.H. Kennedy Inspector General RUC Headquarters Belfast 5, 22nd June 
1966 to J.E. Greeves, Ministry of Home Affairs, Stormont, Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, 
File No. CAB9B/300/1. 
xiii Report on ‘Paisleyite Movement’ dated 20 June 1966 from Inspector General RUC referred to in  
letter marked secret from A.H. Kennedy Inspector General RUC Headquarters Belfast 5, 22nd June 
1966 to J.E. Greeves, Ministry of Home Affairs, Stormont, Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, 
File No. CAB/9B/300/1 
xiv Report on ‘Paisleyite Movement’ dated 20 June 1966 referred to in letter marked secret from A.H. 
Kennedy Inspector General RUC Headquarters Belfast 5, 22nd June 1966 to J.E. Greeves, Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Stormont, Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. CAB9B/300/1. See too 
attached appendices A and B, respectively entitled ‘Incidents and Demonstrations in which Rev. Ian 
R.K. Paisley and members of the Free Presbyterian Church were concerned’ dated 17th June 1966 and 
‘Paisleyite Movement’ dated 20th June 1966. 
xv Secret Memo to the Cabinet by the Minister of Home Affairs R.W.B. McConnell 25 July 1966, 
Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. CAB9B/300/1. 
xvi Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Stormont Castle on Monday 25th July, 1966 at 
4:15pm, Public Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. CAB9B/300/1. 
xvii Deputation from Ministers of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster Received by the Prime 
Minister in the Conference Room, Stormont Castle, at 11am, on Wednesday 10th October 1966, Public 
Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. CAB9B/300/1 
xviii Deputation from Ministers of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster Received by the Prime 
Minister in the Conference Room, Stormont Castle, at 11am, on Wednesday 10th October 1966, Public 
Records Office, Northern Ireland, File No. CAB9B/300/1. 
xix Letter from Stratton Mills MP to PM Terence O’Neill 1st November 1966, Public Records Office, 
Northern Ireland, File No. CAB/J9/74.  
xx Document entitled ‘Statement of Present Problem’, no date but the document can be dated to 
sometime around September 1966, available at Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, File No. 
PM/5/31/23 Ulster Unionist Council: Annual Conference arrangements, business meetings, PM’s 
Speech etc, 1966-9. 
xxi Document entitled ‘Statement of Present Problem’, no date but the document can be dated to 
sometime around September 1966, available at Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, File No. 
PM/5/31/23 Ulster Unionist Council: Annual Conference arrangements, business meetings, PM’s 
Speech etc, 1966-9. 
xxii Claims made by Spence should by viewed in the context of an ongoing debate in the secondary 
literature that seeks to link or disassociate Paisley with the UVF.  For example, Ed Moloney and Andy 
Pollak have pointed to the direct link between Paisley and the Ulster Volunteers in 1966 in the form of 
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one of Paisley’s associates, Noel Doherty (1986: 140).  Doherty was sentenced to two years in prison 
for his part in a conspiracy to procure arms for the UVF.  Paisley escaped arrest in relation to this 
offence because the Attorney General felt a charge could not be sustained (Moloney and Pollak, 1986: 
141).  Doherty was a close colleague of Paisley’s.  He had joined Paisley’s church in 1956.  In 1964 
Paisley selected him as one of four ‘Protestant Unionist’ candidates in the Belfast corporation election.  
Doherty had not only worked at the publication and printing of the Protestant Telegraph but had also 
suggested the establishment of the Ulster Defence Constitution Committee in April 1966 (Boutlon, 
1973: 31, 34).  Moloney and Pollak have also referred to statements made by Hugh McClean, a 
member of the UVF in Belfast, who was convicted in connection with the Malvern Street killings in 
1966.  During questioning McClean expressed remorse at having listened to Paisley and at allowing 
himself to become involved with the UVF (Moloney and Pollak, 1986: 138), though he subsequently 
retracted this and stated that he had been ‘verballed’ by the RUC (See Garland, 2001: 67).  Clifford 
Smyth has also intimated a connection between Paisley and the UVF, again because of his association 
with Doherty (Smith, 1987: 17).  He has cast doubt over Paisley’s denials that he did not know about 
Doherty’s actions and more generally those of the UVF (Smith, 1987: 18).  Dennis Cooke has referred 
to the fact that some of the individuals, for example Billy Spence, who were key to the formation of the 
UVF in 1966 had been closely associated with Paisley though their membership of the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers which became a subsidiary to the Ulster Constitution Defence Association (Cooke, 1996: 
147-8). Patrick Marrinan again points to the fact that Paisley acted as chauffeur to Doherty on his visit 
to the house of a Free Presbyterian, Robert Murdock, in Portadown where the discussion about the 
procurement of gelignite took place in questioning Paisley’s denials of involvement (Marrinan, 1973: 
98-101).  Not only has Paisley denied any connection with the violence of the UVF but so too have 
those who were members of the UVF in that period (Moloney and Pollak, 1986: 139; Garland, 2001: 
66-7).  Bruce has cast doubt on the link between Paisley and the UVF.  He has down-played the 
relationship between Paisley and those few in the Free Presbyterian Church and the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers who were prepared to commit crimes to achieve their aims (Bruce, 1986: 80).  However, 
the close relationship between Paisley and Doherty, for example, has already been referred to above. 
Bruce has further questioned the credibility of informers who claimed such a link between the UVF 
and Paisley and pointed to the fact that a jury decided not to accept their testimony (1986: 79).  Bruce 
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